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CASES NOTED
APPEAL AND ERROR
TRIAL TAcTIcs - MENTION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE - Powell V.
Goforth, 188 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1966). - Appellee passenger was injured
while riding on one of appellant's buses. Appellant's counsel during cross-
examination of one of appellee's witnesses introduced into evidence, for im-
peachment purposes, a statement signed by the witness. The court held that
it is not prejudicial error on re-direct examination to show that the state-
ment was prepared by a representative of the appellant's insurance carrier.
In so holding and extending to insurance companies the Alabama rule
that when a conflict between a witness' testimony at trial and a signed, pre-
pared out-of-court statement is pointed out by the defendant, the party in
whose behalf the statement was prepared may be revealed to the jury, the
court rejected the time-honored rule that the matter of insurance coverage
can never be mentioned at trial.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
DISBARMENT - EMB=Z7LEMENT OF CLIENTS FUNDS - In re Quimby,
359 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1966). - Appellant, an attorney who had prac-
ticed law for more than forty years, appropriated funds from the estates of
two incompetents whom he represented. When the appropriation was dis-
covered, appellant repaid the money with interest. He was disbarred by the
district court.
On appeal, appellant pointed to his long years of service in the legal pro-
fession and contended that disbarment was designed to protect the public
from those unfit or unreliable to practice law. The court held, however,
that "when a member of the bar is found to have betrayed his high trust by
embezzling funds entrusted to him, disbarment should follow as a matter of
course. . . . Only the most stringent of extenuating circumstances would
justify a lesser disciplinary action . . . such as suspension which implies the
likelihood that at some future time the court may again be willing to hold
out the embezzler as an officer of the court worthy of clients' trust."
AUTOMOBILES
CONTROL AND REGULATION - INJURIES TO HIGHWAYS - Kruck v. Nee-
dles, 144 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1966). - Plaintiff's prior successful action
for a declaratory judgment that the state statute prohibiting metal pro-
tuberances from snow tires was void for vagueness or unconstitutional as an
unreasonable interference with interstate commerce was reversed on appeal,
the court holding that the statute was dear on its face and was not ambigu-
ous. Indicating that the lower court erred in attempting to make the 1937
statute meet 1966 technological advances in snow tires by holding it vague
and therefore unconstitutional, the court noted that it is the province of the
legislature rather than the courts to pass upon the wisdom or advisability of
a statute. In disposing of the contention that the statute was uncoustitu-
tional as an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce, the court
distinguished the instant case from Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520 (1959), the plaintiff's primary support, by saying that the statute
was reasonably designed to conserve the highway system of the state.
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SAFETY RESPONSIBILTY ACT - DUE PROCESS - Adams v. City of Poca-
tello, 416 P.2d 46 (Idaho 1966). - Plaintiff petitioned for writ of habeas
corpus because of being confined in defendant's jail for driving while his
license was suspended. The Idaho Safety Responsibility Act required peti-
tioner, an uninsured motorist, to deposit four hundred dollars, the computed
damage in plaintiffs recent auto collision, as security to satisfy any possible
judgment against him.
The majority of states have some kind of safety responsibility or finan-
cial responsibility law. These have been sustained in every jurisdiction when
there is provided a judicial review of the license suspension and where there
is a compelling public interest to justify the suspension before the hearing.
The court held that equal protection of the law is not abridged although
uninsured drivers are divided into various classes, since the groupings are
reasonable and individuals within the same class are treated similarly.
BANKRUPTCY
RFINCORPORAnON AND REORGANlZAnON - SETOFF - In¢ the Matter of
Yale Express Sys., Inc., 362 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1966). - Contractual provi-
sions bound Boston Insurance Company to act as surety for Yale Express
System with reference to certain cargo damage claims. When financial re-
organization proceedings involving Yale began, numerous damage claims
were advanced against Boston by customers who owed Yale freight charges.
Boston wanted the freight charges set off against the claims, but the reor-
ganization court denied the request. Upon appeal, the circuit court ruled:
(1) as surety, Boston was equitably entitled to the setoff; (2) if bankruptcy
proceedings were involved, the right should be recognized; (3) by analogy
to bankruptcy, the right is allowable in reorganization proceedings if the
reorganization court, upon rehearing, finds that its objectives would not be
impeded.
Previous cases dealing with the availability of equitable setoff to a surety
whose principal is involved in reorganization have stated that section 68 of
the Bankruptcy Act may give the right to setoff in a bankruptcy proceeding
but that section 68 does not dictate that outcome in reorganization. After
reviewing general suretyship law, the Bankruptcy Act, and past cases, the
court adopted and restated the previous law, finding that the availability of
a setoff would depend upon whether or not it would be compatible with the
requirements of reorganization.
SuMmARY PROCEEDINGS - RECOVERY OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LIEN OR
PLEDE - In re Wiltse Bros. Corp., 361 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1966). - Ap-
pellant sold steel angles to the bankrupt prior to the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. The angles were fabricated into steel pieces which were
sold, free of liens and incumbrances, to a Minnesota corporation which
affixed them to its real estate in Minnesota. Appellant had filed no lien
against the steel pieces but subsequently filed a lien against the Minnesota
real estate and commenced an action to foreclose in a Minnesota court. The
bankruptcy court ordered the transfer of the lien rights from the Minnesota
real estate to the proceeds from the sale of the steel pieces and enjoined the
lienor from prosecuting its foreclosure suit. The court of appeals held that
the bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction to issue the order because it
had acquired jurisdiction over both the lienor and the steel pieces prior to
any state proceeding.
As a general rule a bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction over
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property in its possession, either actual or constructive. This court, how-
ever, extended this principle to cover a situation where a lienor under the
court's jurisdiction seeks to impose a lien against real estate not within the
court's possession but which is the situs of chattels sold free of liens and
incumbrances by the receiver.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DuE PROCESS - JURY SELECTiON - Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13(5th Cir. 1966). - Plaintiffs brought a class action against the members of
the Jury Board of Jefferson County, Alabama, alleging that the Board's
methods of selecting jurors constituted a systematic exclusion of qualified
Negroes from juries in that county. Although the evidence tended to show
that the nonwhite population of Jefferson County was twenty-nine percent
of the total population and that this ratio was not proportionate to the
number of nonwhites actually serving on juries, the district court denied
plaintiffs prayer for a temporary injunction on the ground that such evi-
dence was insufficient to support a finding of improper conduct or constitu-
tional wrongdoing on the part of the Jury Board.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit held that
"minimal representation of the group claimed to have been excluded from a
particular jury roll in comparison with their proportion of the population is
a proper element of proof, but such proof standing alone does not constitute
sufficient evidence of constitutional violation if it is adequately explained
and is not long continued." The court also pointed out that the disparity
appeared to have been the result of either a lack of interest in jury service
or failure of the members of plaintiffs' class to avail themselves of the oppor-
tunities provided by the Jury Board.
HABEAS CORPUS - DELAY IN APPOINTING COUNSEL - Timmons V.
Peyton, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1966). - Defendant, who had a low men-
tality and a history of mental disorders, was accused of murdering one
woman and wounding another. Shortly after he was arrested, he was com-
mitted to a mental institution where he remained for almost three months
before he was adjudged competent to stand trial. Although defendant had
requested counsel, none was appointed until three days before he was in-
dicted by the grand jury. In addition, during the period of his commit-
ment, the state's attorney was actively engaged in the preparation of de-
fendant's prosecution.
In reversing the district court's denial of defendant's petition for habeas
corpus, the Fourth Circuit held that he had been denied due process because
of the failure to assign counsel to represent him during "critical pretrial pro-
ceedings which materially affected the outcome of his trial." Although the
court was careful to point out that it did not recognize the right of an
accused to have counsel present while his competency to stand trial is being
determined, it was stated that "the preparation of the defense may not...
be postponed indefinitely until the state has completed its case. . . . We
think the preparation of his defense could and should have been allowed to
proceed concurrently with the state's." Finally, the court stated that its
position was supported by the fact that under Virginia law the defendant
had the burden of proving his insanity.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - WAIVER OR CONSENT - United States v. Bla-
lock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966). - Defendant was suspected of
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robbing a bank which had recorded the serial numbers of some of the cash
stolen. F.B.I. agents encountered defendant in his hotel lobby, questioned
him, frisked him in the men's room, and then went to his room. The agents
advised defendant of his right to counsel and to remain silent, but said
nothing about his right to insist on a search warrant. Then with defendant's
permission, they searched the room without a warrant and discovered marked
money which was the subject of a motion to suppress. The court held that
this search was illegal.
In other areas of constitutional law an accused can intelligently waive his
rights. The same is true in the area of search and seizure. The government
argued that the defendant's cdnsent to the search was a waiver of his rights.
However, the court found that while this may have been a waiver, it was
not an intelligent one in that the defendant was uninformed of his rights.
The court stated that it would not be an undue burden to require the agents
to inform the accused of his right to demand a search warrant.
CRimiNAL LAw
CONFESSIONS - ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CONFESSIONS - People V. Cren-
shaw, 50 Cal. Rptr. 429 (Ct. App. 1966). - Defendant appealed from a
conviction for procuring. He had been arrested after complainant made a
report which identified defendant, described his pink Cadillac, and made
criminal charges against him. Statements made by defendant at his initial
interrogation were introduced in evidence. The court held that the accusa-
tory stage had been reached when the statements were taken and that failure
to advise defendant of his constitutional rights at the start of the interroga-
tion made them inadmissible. Judge Fleming dissented saying that the first
few questions following arrest are only investigatory.
DEFENSE - CONDONATION AND SETTLEMENT - State v. Davis, 188 So.
2d 24 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966). - In a case of first impression in the state,
the Florida appellate court upheld the validity of an agreement made be-
tween the defendant and an assistant state attorney to the effect that the
defendant should take a polygraph test. The parties agreed that if the
test indicated that the defendant was telling the truth, the state would dis-
miss the charges against him, but if the test showed that he was lying, the
defendant would plead guilty to manslaughter. The court distinguished the
instant case from those in which immunity is promised an admittedly guilty
person, such immunity being a prohibition against sentencing rather than
prosecution.
In affirming the granting of the defendant's motion to quash the indict-
ment, the court followed decisions of West Virginia, Louisiana, and New
Jersey which have granted similar motions under similar situations, their ra-
tionale being that a promise of immunity made by a prosecutor with court
approval is a pledge of public faith, and one that should not be lightly disre-
garded.
EVIDENCE - OTHER OFFENSES AS EVIDENCE OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
- United States v. Kirkpatrick, 361 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1966). - Defend-
ant, an employee of the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Williamsburg,
Ohio, was convicted on four counts arising under 18 U.S.C. § 1005, which
provides criminal sanctions for making false entries in books with intent to
defraud a federally insured banking institution. Over a seventeen-month
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period, the defendant withheld deposits from customer accounts, subse-
quently substituting false deposit slips.
The court held that evidence of similar transactions, although not speci-
fied in the bill of particulars or included in the indictment, was admissible
to show criminal intent in the form of a plan or scheme to defraud and to
show the absence of mistake or accident.
EXAMINATION OF JUROR DURING PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS ON HEAR-
ING OF MOTIONS - C.R. Lowdermilk v. State, 186 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Ct. App.
1966). - Defendant Lowdermilk, charged, tried, and found guilty of grand
larceny, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, bribery, conspiracy to commit
bribery, and conspiracy to accept unauthorized compensation, appealed his
conviction, claiming that the judge erred in holding an examination of a
juror without the defendant's presence. The court of appeals, in reversing
defendant't conviction and granting a new trial, held that a judge, receiving a
telephone call from a juror informing him of an attempted bribe, cannot in-
quire of that juror whether the attempted bribe would influence his inde-
pendent judgment without the presence of the defendant and his counsel,
since by statute any examination of a juror must be made in their presence.
INSANITY - PsYcHIAmIc EXAMINATION - State v. Olson, 143 N.W.2d 69
(Minn. 1966). - Petitioner, charged on two counts of first degree murder
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court, on motion of the
state, entered its order requiring a pretrial psychiatric examination of the
defendant to determine his sanity at the time of the commission of the
alleged offenses. Defense attorneys petitioned for a writ of prohibition,
contending that such an order violated the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination and that the district court did not have inherent power to or-
der such an examination in the absence of any state statutes regulating the
procedure.
The supreme court, in granting the writ, held that although statements
made by an accused to the examining psychiatrist would be admissible under
proper insructions limiting such evidence to the determination of insanity,
the possibility is great that a jury would use that testimony in a determina-
tion of guilt. This being the case, the order for a pretrial examination
would compel the petitioner to carry on conversations against his will, con-
trary to the provisions of the fifth amendment.
JURISDICTION OF JUVENILE COURT - QUESTIONING OF MINOR DEFEND-
ANT - Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966). - De-
fendants were convicted of a felony murder. At trial, defendant Harrison
argued that his confession was inadmissible under Harling v. United States,
295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In that case, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals had held that the government was barred from using
against an accused in a criminal trial a confession officially obtained from
him when he was a juvenile detained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.
On appeal, the court distinguished Harling on its facts and held that its
application to Harrison's case would be "absurd." On rehearing, however,
the court held that Harling was controlling, that the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court was exclusive from the time the offense was committed, and
that the absence of a waiver of jurisdiction by that court before the formal
confession was elicited made it inadmissible.
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PLEADING - NoLo CONTENDERE - People v. Franchi, 142 N.W.2d 881
(Mich. Ct. App. 1966). - Appellant, charged with larceny, was arraigned
before a magistrate and without benefit of counsel entered a plea of not
guilty. Appellant was again arraigned on June 30 of the same year, again
without benefit of counsel and upon request his plea was changed from not
guilty to nolo contendere. Subsequently, appellant was sentenced to serve
in the state penitentiary.
On appeal the conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered, the
court holding that it is improper for a court to accept a plea of nolo con-
tendere to a felony charge carrying a possible prison sentence and to treat
such a plea as a guilty plea. Reasoning that since the only authority for
the use of a plea of nolo contendere is an attorney general's opinion suggest-
ing its use in misdemeanors not requiring a prison sentence and that the
state statutes mention no plea of nolo contendere, the court determined that
there is no good reason for recognizing a plea which is neither a plea of
guilty or of not guilty.
PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS - CHRONIC ALCOHOLISM AS A DEFENSE - Eas-
ter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966). - Defendant
was convicted of violating a District of Columbia statute prohibiting public
drunkenness. His defense was that he was a chronic alcoholic, but the
court found this unpersuasive.
In reversing both the conviction and 'its affirmance by the court of ap-
peals, the circuit court of appeals held that the act of Congress embodied in
the D.C. Code indicated that the statute in question was not intended to
apply to chronic alcoholics who have "lost the power of self-control in the
use of intoxicating beverages." The court also stated that even in the ab-
sence of the legislative history of the statute, which clearly supported its
finding, reversal would be required because "one who is a chronic alcoholic
cannot have the mens rea necessary to be held responsible criminally for
being drunk in public."
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - EVIDENCE WRONGFULLY OBTAINED - Hajdu v.
State, 189 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966). - Defendant was convicted of
engaging in the practice of medicine while not holding a license from the
State Board of Medical Examiners. Evidence was presented at trial by a
state-board-employed private detective who had overheard statements made
by defendant to an employee of the detective by way of an electronic trans-
mitter planted in the employee's purse. Defendant objected and appealed
on the grounds that such evidence was obtained in violation of his state and
federal constitutional rights. In reversing defendant's conviction, the Florida
court held that the use of information obtained by a person outside the de-
fendants apartment by use of such devices constituted a violation of the
right of privacy preserved by the fourth amendment.
The court refused to recognize the distinction previously drawn by the
United States Supreme Court holdings that a trespass or breaking of the
dose by using electronic devices is contrary to the fourth amendment,
whereas when the dose is not broken no violation occurs; instead, it as-
serted that both types of intrusion constitute invasions of privacy.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - HOSPITAL AS A PUBLIC PLACE - State v. Turner,
416 P.2d 409 (Ariz. 1966). - Defendant, accused of assault with intent
to murder, sought to suppress, on the basis of an unreasonable search and
seizure, the introduction of a bullet removed from his head. In affirming
the lower court's conviction, it was held that the bullet imbedded in the de-
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fendant, who had voluntarily appeared at the hospital for treatment, was not
the product of a search.
Arizona had previously held that the guarantee against search and seizure
did not apply to public places, and the court in this case extended the rule
to hospital waiting rooms, despite the physician-patient relationship, be-
cause the evidence was in plain view.
DIVERSITY
UNITED STATES COURT - JURISDICTION AND POWER IN GENERAL - Ak-
ron Co. v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 7 Ohio Misc. 287 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
Plaintiff sued in federal court under diversity of citizenship to recover against
insurance policies issued by the defendant, an unauthorized foreign insurer
under Ohio law. Plaintiff moved to strike defendant's answer because of
failure to comply with OHIO REv. CODE § 3901.18 which requires the post-
ing of some form of security by a foreign insurer before filing any pleading.
Defendant claimed that this provision was procedural and not binding in
the federal court. It was held that since the questioned provision did not
conflict with the federal rules and would substantially affect the outcome of
the case, the provision was substantive and therefore binding.
DIVORCE
ACCESs TO CHILD BY PARENT DEPRVIED OF CUSTODY - COURT DISCRE-
TION - Reardon v. Reardon, 416 P.2d 571 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). - De-
fendant husband petitioned the court for a modification of an absolute di-
vorce decree which granted his wife custody of the children but was silent
as to visitation rights. The court of appeals in a case of first impression
held that the trial court was vested with the discretion to limit the visitation
rights of a parent. The lower court's ruling that the minor children of
divorced parents would be benefited by conditioning the father's visitation
privileges upon payment of support was thus affirmed.
A division of authority exists in the United States as to whether the
courts have the authority to enter this type of order, since many jurisdictions
regard parental visitations as a right, not a privilege. The Arizona court
rested its denial of visitation upon the theory that a recalcitrant and irre-
sponsible father is not to be overindulged in the preservation of this
privilege while refusing to discharge his obligation of support.
HEALTH
REGULATIONS AND OFFENSES - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATIONS
- Grossman v. Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345, 218 N.E.2d 259, 271 N.Y.S.
2d 195 (1966). - Plaintiffs, prior to the enactment of a prohibiting provi-
sion in New York City's health code, had been engaged in the business of
tattooing. A section of the health code, passed in 1961, stated that tattooing
could be performed only by doctors for medical reasons. Plaintiffs sought
to have this section declared unconstitutional. At the trial the defendants
offered evidence showing that there was a connection between tattooing and
the disease of hepatitis and that regulation of laymen conducting tattooing
parlors would be ineffective to curb the disease.
The court upheld the section of the health code as valid since the Board
of Health had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in attempting to regulate
matters concerning public health.
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INSURANCE
ACCIDENT AND HEALTH - CONDITIONS COVERED - Bartalis v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 218 N.E.2d 225 (111. Ct. App. 1966). - Plaintiff, a
certificate holder of the defendant company, was injured in an automobile
accident and received out-patient hospital treatment while the policy was
still in effect. After the policy had expired, however, plaintiff incurred
hospitalization expenses and underwent surgery. The terms of the policy
covered hospitalization and surgical expenses incurred by "any Certificate-
holder while insured." The circuit court held that plaintiff could recover
for his hospitalization expenses, and the insurance company appealed. The
appellate court determined the controlling issue to be whether expenses in-
curred after teraination as a result of injuries sustained prior to termination
were within the terms of the contract or, if such expenses were not so con-
tained, whether public policy and justice nevertheless required that liability
attach. The court answered both questions in the negative and reversed for
the insurance company.
In its decision the appellate court recognized the well-established princi-
ple that the rule of liberal construction of insurance contracts in favor of
the insured is subservient to rules of reasonable construction and that the
rule construing ambiguities strictly against the insurer must not pervert the
plain meaning of the words so as to create an ambiguity when none in fact
exists.
INTOXI CATING LIQUORS
POWER TO CONTROL TRAFFIC - CONCURRENT AND CONFLICTING REGU-
LATIONS BY STATE AND MUNICIPA.LITY - City of Canton V. Imperial
Bowling Lanes, Inc., 7 Ohio Misc. 292 (Munic. Ct. Canton 1966). - De-
fendant, owner of bowling lanes and a restaurant, was licensed by the
Liquor Department of Ohio to sell intoxicating beverages on the premises.
Plaintiff, pursuant to a municipal ordinance, brought an action against the
defendant for violation of a zoning restriction on the sale of intoxicants.
No Ohio statute, or rule or regulation of the Board of Liquor Control refers
to zoning regulations on liquor sales. The municipal court, in sustaining
defendant's demurrer, held that the ordinance was in direct conflict with
state law and was therefore unconstitutional.
The court applied the prevailing view that "the test is whether the ordi-
nance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits and
vice versa." However, it is generally held that an ordinance declaring spe-
cific acts unlawful does not directly conflict with a statute which does not
refer to those acts. The court's decision is upheld in a minority of juris-
dictions.
JUDGMENT
RES JUDICATA - MASTER AND SERVANT - Marange v. Marshall, 402
S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). - Plaintiff was involved in an auto-
mobile accident with the defendant, an employee of an automobile dealer,
during the course of the defendants employment. Plaintiff sued the em-
ployer and recovered damages. The money was paid into court, but plaintiff
refused the money and sued defendant. The court held that plaintiff was
barred from further recovery by the doctrine of res judicata.
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The court recognized that the question was one of first impression in
Texas but that at least ten other states had deemed such a situation to be
res judicata. While a master and servant are not privies, as such, the doc-
trine of respondeat superior, the fact that both the master and servant can
be sued in one action, the plaintiff's election to sue the employer, and the
public policy against multiplicity of suits were sufficient reasons for the
court to find that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the master-servant
relationship.
LABOR RELATIONS
SECONDARY BOYCOTT - SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - Wellsr v. NLRB, 361
F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1966). - The business agent for the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers began a campaign to force the general
contractor of a building project to discharge the petitioner because he was
not a union contractor. The agent met with representatives of the two other
unions involved, and they visited the contractor and told him that the situa-
tion of having a non-union man on the job must cease. The contractor told
his men that they could not continue working because there was a non-
union electrician on the job and proceeded to solicit bids from union elec-
tricians.
The court held that there was substantial evidence to sustain the findings
of the examiner in favor of petitioner. The court concluded that the union's
agents conduct was threatening and coercive, with the objective of forcing
the contractor to fire the petitioner and that these actions amounted to a
secondary boycott within the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (i, ii) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
NEGLIGENCE
NATURE AND ELEMENTS - ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE - Mick
v. Kroger Co., 218 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966). - Plaintiff's judgment
for personal injuries was affirmed on appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals
holding that, where one has customarily offered services to business invitees,
ceasing to provide those services may under certain circumstances proxi-
mately cause personal injury and be a failure to exercise due care. For
several years plaintiff had shopped at defendant's store where, as was a
custom, carry-out service was provided for customers with heavy packages.
Plaintiff had purchased several items and after passing through the checkout
counter was told that she would have to manage as best she could with her
thirty-pound package because there was no one present to help her carry
the merchandise to her car. While carrying the package from the store
plaintiff turned her ankle when stepping from a curb; the weight of the
package carried her to the ground, and she suffered a broken foot.
The court held that under the circumstances the defendant owed a duty
of due care to the shopper and that the jury's determination that the de-
fendant had failed to protect the shopper from a reasonably foreseeable un-
reasonable risk of harm was justified by the existence of a custom of carry-
ing such parcels for its customers.
PAUPERS
LOCAL AuTHOmnmS - STATE PAUPERS - Strat-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott,
218 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966). - Plaintiff taxpayers sought to
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enjoin use of public funds for payment of public assistance to strikers and
their families. The Illinois appellate court held that strikers and their
families are eligible for aid under the Public Assistance Code, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 23, § 401 (1963), since they are persons who are unable to
maintain a decent and healthful standard of living for "unavoidable causes"
and who do not refuse "suitable employment or training."
Behind the court's holding is its belief that economic need would not
arise solely from participation in a strike and that the right to strike should
not require giving up the right to assistance. The court justified its posi-
tion, which is contrary to that maintained under the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 434 (1965), by referring to
contemporary administrative practices initiated sixteen years ago by an un-
published opinion of the state's attorney general. The legislature's tacit
approval of the act's administration provided additional support for the
court's position.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OFFICIAL ACmS - COMMON LAW JUDICIAL IM-
MUNITy - Bauers -v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966). - Plaintiff,
after serving fifteen years of a sentence, brought suit for damages against the
county prosecutor who had filed the original indictment, alleging depriva-
tion of liberty and a denial of the right to a speedy trial because he was a
juvenile when the offenses were committed. The court, in deciding the
question of whether a prosecutor or other judicial officer is immune from
suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, overruled precedent in order to
grant the defendant immunity. The act provides for civil redress for an im-
proper prosecution, but only if the officer has acted dearly outside of his
jurisdiction.
The controlling law in the Third Circuit formerly afforded no immunity
to judicial officers, on the theory that the act had abrogated common law
protection. However, the court reinstated judicial immunity, following the
well-settled principle that the common law is not derogated unless the
statute expressly so states.
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